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Developing Governmental
I/ability Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
I. INTRODUCTION
Federal law allows a person injured by unconstitutional
police behavior to recover damages from the offending officer in-
dividually,1 but it does not allow recovery from the governmental
body -employing the officer.2 Due to the difficulties in recover-
ing from an individual officer, the effectiveness of the right of re-
covery is seriously curtailed as a device both to compensate in-
jured plaintiffs and encourage police action consistent with con-
stitutional guarantees. This Note examines two recent develop-
ments that may allow an injured individual to recover in a
federal court under federal law from local governmental bodies
for the unconstitutional conduct of their police officers. The
first possibility is the further expansion of the relief avail-
able under section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, codified as 42
U.S.C. § 1983, s which gives persons injured by unconstitutional
behavior under color of state law a tort-like right of recovery.
Recently, the courts have narrowed the rule that governmental
bodies are not liable under section 1983 by granting increasingly
broad relief. The second possibility is that section 1983 may
be read together with section 3 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866,
codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1988,4 which allows state remedies to be
1. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
2. Id. (municipal governments); Williford v. California, 352 F.2d
474 (9th Cir. 1965) (state governments).
3. Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Consti-
tution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action
at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. §- 1983 (1964).
As originally enacted as Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13,
section 1983 provided a remedy for persons deprived of rights "secured
by the Constitution of the United States .. .. " This provision was
changed in the revision of 1874 to read rights "secured by the Constitu-
tion and laws of the United States .... 1" For the full text of section
1983 as originally passed, see note 68 infra.
4. The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters confer-
red on the district courts by the provisions of this chapter and
Title 18, for the protection of all persons in the United States
in their civil rights, and for their vindication, shall be exercised
and enforced in conformity with the laws of the United States,
so far as such laws are suitable to carry the same into effect;
but in all cases where they are not adapted to the object, or are
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used by federal courts for the vindication of civil rights where
ordinary federal remedies are inadequate, as incorporating the
right to recover tort-like damages directly from local govern-
ments. Of course, this second possibility is only available in those
states where the state and local governments are liable for the
torts of their officials under state law. While the issues discussed
apply equally to the liability of both states and their political
subdivisions, the approaches suggested in this Note are restricted
to the political subdivisions because of the constitutional difficul-
ties in federal imposition of liability directly on the states.6
deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable reme-
dies and punish offenses against law, the common law, as modi-
fied and changed by the constitution and statutes of the State
wherein the court having jurisdiction of such civil or criminal
cause is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with the
Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be extended to
and govern the said courts in the trial and disposition of the
cause, and, if it is of a criminal nature, in the infliction of pun-
ishment on the party found guilty.
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1964).
5. The Court in Monroe did not consider the constitutionality of
imposing municipal liability. 365 U.S. at 191, 259. The imposition of
governmental liability raises constitutional issues as to Congress' power
over municipalities and states and as to possible eleventh amendment
prohibition of suits by individuals against municipalities and states in
federal courts.
The several bases of congressional power to impose liability on
states and municipalities are the necessary and proper clause, section 5
of the fourteenth amendment, and possibly, the commerce clause. The
power of Congress to subject municipalities to standards enforced by the
equity powers of federal courts is well established. See text accompany-
ing notes 36-57 infra. The power of Congress to impose financial lia-
bility on municipalities is also well established. See, e.g., Jones Act, 46
U.S.C. § 688 (1964); Frame v. City of New York, 34 F. Supp. 194 (S.D.N.Y.
1940); see also notes 45-49 infra. In addition, it is well settled that a
municipality is not shielded from suit in a federal court by the eleventh
amendment. Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890). In Monroe
the defendant did not raise the eleventh amendment defense.
There is less precedent for federal imposition of liability on states
themselves. However, in Damico v. California, 389 U.S. 416 (1967), the
Supreme Court granted injunctive relief against the state of California in
a suit brought under section 1983. There is weak precedent for an award
of money damages based on the commerce clause. California v. United
States, 320 U.S. 577 (1944); United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175
(1936). Since Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890) interpreted the
eleventh amendment to bar suits against states themselves in federal
courts by citizens of the defendant state as well as by citizens of other
states, a state may only be sued if it consents. Implied consent, however,
has been liberally found. Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n,
359 U.S. 275 (1959); Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, rehearing de-
nied, 377 U.S. 1010 (1964). Implied consent has been found in state im-
position of liability for the torts of government officers. Sostre v. Rocke-
feller, 312 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), rev'd in part, Sostre v. McGin-
1202 [Vol. 55:1201
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II. ORIGIN AND, CRITICISM OF THE RULE OF
GOVERNMENTAL NON-LIABILITY
A. THE Monroe DECISION
Section 1983 was enacted pursuant to section 5 of the four-
teenth amendment6 to control the disorders caused by the Ku
Klux Klan in the Reconstruction South. It lay dormant until
the late 1940's when courts began to use it to provide relief for
persons injured by unconstitutional behavior.' In 1961, in re-
sponse to a case of flagrantly abusive police misconduct, the Su-
preme Court gave section 1983 its present contours. In Monroe
v. Pape,s 13 Chicago police officers broke into the plaintiff's
home in the early hours of the morning. The police forced Mr.
Monroe, a Negro, and his family to stand naked in the living room
while they ransacked every room in the house, ripping open mat-
tresses and emptying drawers. Mr. Monroe was then taken to
the police station and held on open charges for ten hours for in-
terrogation about a two day old murder without being brought
before a magistrate, and without being permitted to call his fam-
ily or an attorney. He was subsequently released without being
charged.9
In holding the individual policemen civilly liable under sec-
tion 1983 the Court outlined five major features of relief avail-
able under the section.10 First, section 1983 provides a remedy
for infringement of constitutional guarantees applied to states by
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment." Secondly,
the phrase "under color of" state law does not restrict relief to
cases where injury was inflicted with specific statutory authori-
zation. The phrase was broadly interpreted to mean "[mlisuse
of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible
only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state
law .... -12 Thirdly, the injurious act need not be done with a
nis, No. 35038 (2d Cir. Feb. 24, 1971). For a general discussion of the de-
clining force of the eleventh amendment see Note, Private Suits Against
States in the Federal Courts, 33 U. Cirr. L. Rsv. 331 (1966).
6. 365 U.S. at 171.
7. For a general discussion of the early development of section
1983, see Note, The Proper Scope of the Civil Rights Acts, 66 HIARv. L. Rrv.
1285 (1953).
8. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
9. Id. at 169.
10. Federal courts have jurisdiction in section 1983 actions without
reference to the amount in contr6versy under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) & (4)
(1964).
11. 365 U.S. at 171.
12. Id. at 184. The Court quoted from United States v. Classic, 313
19711 1203
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specific intent to deprive a person of a federal right. Liability is
instead determined "against the background of tort liability that
makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of his ac-
tions.' 1 3 Fourthly, the remedy under section 1983 is completely
supplemental to state remedies. State remedies, regardless of
availability or efficacy, need not be sought before appeal to fed-
eral court.1 4 Fifthly, and most importantly, municipalities are
not "persons" within the meaning of the phrase that "every per-
son" who deprives another of a right "under color of" state law is
liable for the injury.15 As a result of this definition of "person,"
municipalities are not liable under section 1983 for the actions of
their police officers. Other courts have subsequently held that
state governments are also not "persons" within the meaning of
section 1983 and thus not liable for the actions of their officers. 10
The Court based the rule of governmental non-liability on
the legislative history of the 1871 Civil Rights Act.17 It looked to
the reaction in the House of Representatives to a proposed amend-
ment that would have made any "county, city or parish"
liable if any "persons riotously and tumultously assembled to-
gether" within its boundaries destroyed or damaged "any house,
tenement, cabin, shop, building, barn, or granary .. ." or
"whipped, scourged, wounded, or killed. . ." any person.' 8 The
U.S. 299 (1941), where the Court had interpreted the same phrase in 18
U.S.C. § 242 (1964).
13. 365 U.S. at 187. It is not clear if a simple negligent act will
give rise to a section 1983 action. In Jenkins v. Averett, 424 F.2d 1228
(4th Cir. 1970), the court accepted arguendo the defendant's claim that
the act of shooting the plaintiff during an arrest was accidental "in the
sense that it was not specifically intended," but allowed recovery because
the shooting was "gross or culpable" negligence. The court distin-
guished the situation before it from one involving simple negligence
and refused to speculate on the latter. The dissent in Jenkins argued
that the term "deprivation" in section 1983 could not support a damage
claim in a case involving negligence, whether characterized as simple or
culpable.
14. Id. at 183. See also Damico v. California, 389 U.S. 416 (1967);
McNeese v. Bd. of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963).
15. 365 U.S. at 191. As a result of this ruling the City of Chicago
was dismissed as a defendant in Monroe. Plaintiffs had argued that the
City of Chicago should be liable under a theory of respondeat superior.
Brief for Appellant at 25, Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). They also
could have argued that a municipality is strictly liable for the conduct of
its officers directly from section 1983, whether or not the technical re-
quirements of respondeat superior are met.
16. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); Williford v. California,
352 F.2d 474 (9th Cir. 1965).
17. 365 U.S. at 187-92.
18. CONG. GLoBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 663 (1871).
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House defeated the amendment.' 9 A modification was sub-
mitted,20 and it too was defeated.2  The Court reasoned that
"[t]he response of Congress to the proposal to make municipali-
ties liable... was so antagonistic that we cannot believe that
the word 'person' was used in this particular Act to include
them." 22
B. PROPRIETY OF Monroe's USE OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
It appears upon closer analysis that both the Monroe Court's
interpretation of the particular congressional debates and its very
use of legislative history as determinative of the meaning of sec-
tion 1983 are open to criticism.
The proposed amendment used by the Court to indicate con-
gressional disapproval of municipal liability would have made a
community liable for the enumerated acts by anyone within that
community, regardless of either knowledge or assent by the local
citizenry or by the local government to the illegal act. The blan-
ket liability for acts not sanctioned by the community, which
could easily be perpetrated by outsiders or undesirables, raised
the strong opposition noted by the Court.2 3 The Court did not
consider a separate practice discussed during the same debates
whereby governmental bodies were themselves held liable for in-
jury caused by their failure to perform or by their failure to per-
form properly assumed duties..2 4 This liability was noted with-
out disapproval during the debates both by those in favor of and
by those opposed to the proposed amendment. -5 If viewed in
19. Id. at 725.
20. Id. at 749.
21. Id. at 800-01.
22. 365 U.S. at 191.
23. CONG. GLOBE, supra note 18, at 788.
24. See Darlington v. New York, 31 N.Y. Rep. (4 Tiffany) 164
(1865).
25. This policy was noted with approval by Congressman Shela-
barger of Ohio, a proponent of the proposed amendment CONG. GLoBE,
42d Cong., Ist Sess. 751-52 (1871). Congressman Kerr of Indiana, an op-
ponent of the proposed amendment, noted the policy without disap-
proval Id. at 788. He stated:
In the States to which reference has been made it is, I
agree, somewhat common to require the municipal organizations
created by those States, which are part and parcel of the local
machinery adopted by the State governments m the execution of
their reserved powers, to require them to perform certain duties
which are necessary in the police regulation, government, and
protection of society, and to punish them where they fail to exe-
cute the duties thus imposed upon them, sometimes by fines and
penalties, to be exacted in ways indicated in the laws of those
States. But there is no example of the precise character in-
volved in this bill.
19711 1205
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terms of the scope of a community's liability, the proposed
amendment would have imposed extremely broad liability, while
the practice of holding communities responsible for misfeasance
or nonfeasance would have imposed narrower liability. Monroe
itself involved a third scope of liability narrower than either of
the previous two: the imposition of liability for the misfeasance
of an official amounting to unconstitutional behavior.
The legislative history does not indicate where on this spec-
trum of liability Congress would have drawn its line of approval.
It clearly disapproved of the extremely broad liability of the pro-
posed amendment. There was, however, no apparent disapprov-
al of the middle range of governmental liability for misfeasance
and nonfeasance; and one cannot infer therefore that Congress
disapproved of the even narrower scope of liability for the uncon-
stitutional behavior of a municipal officer urged by the plaintiff
in Monroe.
Further doubt is cast on the Court's reasoning by the so-
called "Dictionary Act," 26 passed February 25, 1871, two months
before passage of section 1983. This Act provided that "the word
'person' may extend and be applied to bodies politic and corpo-
rate." As the Court noted in refusing to apply this definition, its
application is optional.27 However, since the two acts were un-
der consideration at the same time, it is improbable that the con-
gressmen were not aware of the effect of the "Dictionary Act"
on the Civil Rights Act. While this probable awareness, partic-
ularly in view of the optional nature of the Act, does not indicate
that Congress intended municipal liability under section 1983, it
implies that Congress at least did not disapprove of using the
word "person" to include municipalities in statutes subsequently
enacted. It seems reasonable to assume that if Congress had
been as strongly opposed to municipal liability as the Court con-
cluded in Monroe, it would not have used the term "person" in
section 1983, but would have used instead an unequivocal term.
The very use of legislative history to determine whether or
not Congress intended municipalities to be included as persons
under section 1983 is also open to criticism.2 8 Section 1983 was a
26. "An Act Prescribing the Form of the enacting and resolving
Clauses of Acts and Resolutions of Congress, and Rules for the Construc-
tion thereof." Act of Feb. 25, 1871, ch. 71, 16 Stat. 431.
27. 365 U.S. at 190-91. The statute says that "person" may include
municipal corporations, it does not say that it must include them.
28. See DeSloovere, Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretation of Stat-
utes, 88 U. PA. L. Rav. 527 (1940):
[T]he difference between general trend of thought underly-
[Vol. 55:12011206
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ninety year old statute enacted to deal with a situation very dif-
-ferent from the one before the Court in Monroe. The statute was
-nacted to control the disorder in the Reconstruction South and
was expanded to provide a general federal remedy for unconsti-
-tutional behavior "under-color of'! state law on the principle that
a "statue cast in general terms is not limited to effectuating only
-the specific purposes that brought it into being. '2 9 In debating
the specific purpose for which Congress contemplated this gen-
erally worded statute, however, it is reasonable to assume that
Congress considered chiefly the effect of section 1983 on the evil
it was enacted to remedy and did not engage in a speculative de-
bate on its use by future [courts. To determine what Congress
would have thought had it been thinking about something it was
not is speculative at best and it provides a weak foundation on
which to base a judicial decision.
C. Monroe.As A P6z'icy DEcISION
The fact that Congress apparently was not opposed to the
practice of holding municipalities liable for the misfeasance and
nonfeasance of official duties, the passage of the "Dictionary Act,"
and the- difficulties"inherent in using legislative history to guide
the specific application- of a statute such as section 1983 imply
that the Court in Morroe in fact faced an open choice as to
whether or not municipalities could be persons under section 1983.
It appears, therefore; that the Court actually may have reached
its decision'on policy grounds. The Court felt that in Monroe it
was dealing With a question-that "concerns directly a basic prob-
ing a-statute (purpose) and close questions as to textual meaning
that arise only upon application in a given case-the difference
between the particular objectives of a piece of legislation, which
ii and of themselves. do exist in the minds of the legislators at
the'time of enactment and which are. quite discoverable through
extrinsic -aids, and the minutiae of. meaning necessary to apply
it (with, all its contextual implications in view of a particular
,case) which can seldom be in the minds of the majority of the
legislators-is quite. clear and important. ... If by "legislative
intent'. is meant the minutiae.of meaning in application to spe-
cific cases, then rarely does such intention exist.
Id.at 538 (footnotes, omitted). -See also -Willis, Statute Interpretation in a
Nutshell, 16 CAN. B. REv. 1 (1938) (where it is suggested that most uses of
legislative intent are "only a harmless if bombastic, way of referring to
the social policy behihd the Acri); R din, Statutory Interpretation, 43
HAv. L. REv. 863 (1930).
A good illustration of this. problem is the use of the same legislative
history to support opposite interpretations of the "under color of' state
law provision in Monroe.* See majority opinion, 365 U.S. at 173-87 and
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's:dissent, id. at 211-46.
29. Moreno v..Hencke, .431 F.2d 1299, 1304 (5th Cir. 1970).
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lem of American federalism: the relation of the Nation to the
States in the critically important sphere of municipal law ad-
ministration."30 The Court, in applying a statute that was itself
a deliberate advancement of federal power at the expense of state
power,'3 1 decided to extend further the federal power by liber-
ally reading the "under color of" state law provision of section
1983 and by allowing the statute to be used as a remedy complete-
ly supplemental to state remedies.3 2 It is probable that the Court
was unwilling to create a broader expansion of federal authority
in a single decision and thus chose to follow the well-established
precedent of holding the officers individually liable.83
Even if explained as a policy decision, however, the Monroe
holding is open to criticism. In Monroe the court recognized
a class of injury not recognized in tort.3 4  The tort damage
30. 365 U.S. at 222 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
31. Speaking in favor of the bill, Senator Matthew H. Carpenter
noted that it was authorized by the enabling clause of the fourteenth
amendment, which he said was "one of the fundamental, one of the great,
the tremendous revolutions effected in our Government . . . ." CONG.
GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 577 (1871). A number of those in opposition
to the bill noted that the bill could cause a further major change in the
balance between state and federal power. See Whitthorne, id. at 337;
Lewis, id. at 385; Saulsbury, id. at 599. See also Moreno v. Henckel,
431 F.2d 1299, 1305 (5th Cir. 1970); Landry v. Daley, 288 F. Supp. 189,
223 (7th Cir. 1960); Note, Section 1983: A Civil Remedy for the Protec-
tion of Federal Rights, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rzv. 839 (1964).
32. See text accompanying notes 11-14 supra.
33. Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1913); Ex
parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). In arguing against the majority's
reading of the "under color of" state law provision in section 1983, Mr.
Justice Frankfurter observed in a vigorous dissent that the question of
expanding federal power
would be irrelevant to our duty if Congress had demon-
strably meant to reach by § 1979 [§ 1983] activities like those of
respondents in this case. But where it appears that Congress
plainly did not have that understanding, respect for principles
which this Court has long regarded as critical to the most effec-
tive functioning of our federalism should avoid extension of a
statute beyond its manifest area of operation into applications
which invite conflict with administration of local policies. Such
an extenson makes the extreme limits of federal constitutional
power a law to regulate the quotidian business of every traffic
policeman, every registrar of elections, every city inspector or
investigator, every clerk in every municipal licensing bureau in
this country.
365 U.S. at 241-42. The same arguments of course applied to the court's
consideration of municipal liability under section 1983.
34. 365 U.S. at 196 n. 5 (Harlan, J., concurring):
There will be many cases in which the relief provided by
the state to the victim of a use of state power which the state
either did not or could not constitutionally authorize will be far
less than what Congress may have thought would be fair reim-
bursement for deprivation of a constitutional right. I will ven-
ture only a few examples. There may be no damage remedy
1208 [Vol. 55:1201
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to the plaintiff was probably solely dignitary, but the Court
recognized in the deprivation of constitutional guarantees an in-
dependent and serious injury. In creating this new concept of in-
jury, however, the Court provided only a feeble remedy since the
injured person generally cannot be compensated to the full extent
of his injury due to the extreme difficulty in recovering a judg-
ment from a policeman.35 As a means of curbing unconstitutional
police practices and encouraging practices consistent with the
Constitution the remedy is also inadequate. The governmental
body that directs the conduct of the police officers is not liable for
their actions, so liability for unconstitutional misconduct does not
provide a financial incentive for them to provide the necessary
police services in accordance with constitutional guarantees.30
The result is that while the Court expanded the scope of consti-
tutional protection under section 1983, it provided an extremely
inefficacious means of enforcement.37
for the loss of voting rights or for the harm from psychological
coercion leading to a confession. And what is the dollar value
of the right to go to unsegregated schools? Even the remedy
for such an unauthorized search and seizure as Monroe was al-
legedly subjected to may be only the nominal amount of dam-
ages to physical property allowable in an action for trespass to
land. It would indeed be the purest coincidence if the state
remedies for violations of common-law rights by private citizens
were fully appropriate to redress those injuries which only a
state official can cause and against which the Constitution pro-
vides protection.
35. See Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual
Rights, 39 Mn;x. L. REV. 493 (1955); Hall, The Law of Arrest in Relation
to Contemporary Social Problems, 3 U. CHL L. REv. 345, 346-53 (1936).
The fact that the individual officers are usually judgment proof was noted
by the Supreme Court in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) where it
recognized that traditional tort remedies were inadequate to prevent the
unconstitutional seizure of evidence.
36. Professor Zechariah Chafee, Jr. has made the common sense ob-
servation that the most effective way to insure that the policy making
agency compels observance of constitutional guarantees is to make them
financially responsible for injuries caused by their agents. Chafee, Safe-
guarding Fundamental Human Rights: The Tasks of States and Nation,
27 GEo. WASw. L. Rav. 519 (1959). See also Foote, supra note 35; Note,
Philadelphia Police Practice and the Law of Arrest, 100 U. PA. L. REv.
1182 (1952); Note, Grievance Response Mechanisms for Police Miscon-
duct, 55 VA. L. REV. 909 (1969).
37. The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights recognized this problem
almost immediately after Monroe was decided. In 1961 it recommended
that section 1983 be amended to provide municipal liability, but the rec-
ommendation has not led to an amendment. UNmrnD STATEs Comm. o N
CivnL RiGHTS, 1961 Coiwn. oN CIVIL RIGHTS REPoRT: -Book V, 25 (1961).
Professor Chafee has observed that it would be far better for the legisla-
ture to provide new statutory protection against police misconduct.
Chafee, supra note 36. But in the absence of any legislative action,
there has been a constant stream of suggestions for judicial strengthening
1971] 1209
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III. POST-MONROE TREATMENT OF THE RULE OF
GOVERNMENTAL NON-LIABILITY
The Court in Monroe defined "person" to exclude municipali-
tieS38 from the class of entities against whom an "action at law,
suit in equity, or other. . .,9 action could be brought. The rule
has two logical corollaries: it prohibits suits not only for damages,
but for all other actions against a government, because section
1983 was not directed at governments; and since the definition of
"person was based on legislative history, the rule should not
change as policy considerations change.
The lower federal courts, however, have increasingly limited
the rule by ignoring the reasoning behind non-liability and treat-
ing it as a policy question. In a section 1983 suit in 1961 the Sev-
enth Circuit Court of Appeals in Adams v. City of Park Ridge4 °
enjoined the enforcement of a municipal ordinance and declared
it unconstitutional. The court suggested that the Supreme Court
based the Monroe rule not on legislative history, but on policy
arguments against municipal liability for money damages. 4'
Since these arguments did not apply to injunctive and declara-
tory relief, the court granted it, saying "[n]o reason is apparent
why a city and its officials should not be restrained from prospec-
tively violating plaintiffs' constitutional rights pursuant to its
own legislative enactment, and an injunction not be granted as
provided in § 1983. ''42
of the remedies available under section 1983. See Note, The Municipal-
ity, Section 1983 and Pendent Jurisdiction, 5 VAL. L. REv. 110 (1970); Note,
Use of § 1983 to Remedy Unconstitutional Police Conduct: Guarding the
Guards, 5 HARV. Civ. RiGHTs-Civ. Lm. L. REv. 104 (1970) (court appointed
monitors to supervise police conduct); Note, Grievance Response Mech-
anisms for Police Misconduct, 55 VA. L. Rav. 909 (1969) (ombudsmen);
Note, The Federal Injunction as a Remedy for Unconstitutional Police
Conduct, 78 YALE L.J. 143 (1968) (use.of mandatory injunctions). For ar-
guments in favor of expanded federal jurisdiction see Chevigny, Section
1983 Jurisdiction: A Reply, 83 HARv. L. Rzv. 1352, 1356 (1970). The
severe criticism of the decision in Monroe is in part the result of
what Justice Frankfurter called a problem "denuded of illuminating con-
creteness. . . ." 365 U.S. at 202.
38. 365 U.S. at 191.
39. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
40. 293 F.2d 585 (7th Cir. 1961).
41. Id. at 587. The court said:
The facts in Monroe v. Pape suggests [sic] several inherent rea-
sons for excluding municipalities from liability for damages,
such as unauthorized misconduct of the officers lack of power of
city to indemnify plaintiffs for such misconduct, and a city's
governmental immunity in the exercise of its police powers,
from liability for injuries inflicted by policemen in the per-
formance of their duties.
42. Id. at 587.
1210 [Vol. 55:1201
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'Half of the circuits now grant injunctive relief against gov-
ernmental bodies under section 1983.43 Those that do not have
reasoned that because the non-liability rule excludes municipal-
ities from the class amenable to suit under section 1983, it simi-
larly prohibits suits for damages and equitable or declaratory
relief; Furthermore, they have determined that policy arguments
are not relevant.44 Those courts that have followed the lead of
the seventh circuit have viewed the non-liability rule as one of
judicial policy prohibiting governmental liability for money dam-
ages.45 To the extent that they have viewed the rule as one of
policy, the lower courts have modified it as policy considerations
have changed. 46
The rule has been further undercut by a succession of suits
brought by teachers dismissed by school districts which had
adopted plans for racial desegration. In Smith v. Board of Educa-
tion47 and Wall v. Stanley County Board of Education,48 the plain-
tiffs based their complaints solely on section 1983.40 In both cases
the courts allowed injunctive and monetary relief. In each of
these cases, however, the courts awarded damages measured on
contract principles. 0 This action is consistent with the well es-
tablished rule that states and municipalities may be sued in fed-
eral court on their contracts.51 In none of these cases was the
43. Accord,. Hardless v. Sweeny Independent School Dist., 427 F.2d
319 (5th Cir. 1970); Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir.
1970); Scher v. Bd. of Educ., 424 F.2d 741 (3d Cir. 1970); Sostre v. Rocke-
feller, 312 F. Supp: 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), rev'd in part, Sostre v. McGinnis,
No. 350358 (2d Cir. Feb. 24, 1971); Sims v. Juras, 313 F. Supp. 1212 (D.
Ore. 1969). Contra, Rosado v. Wyman, 414 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1969); Dia-
mond v. Pitchess, 411 F.2d 565 (9th Cir. 1969); Deane Hill Country Club,
Inc. v. Knoxville, 379 F.2d 321 (6th Cir. 1967); Morey v. Independent
School Dist., 312 F.Supp. 1257 (D. Minn. 1969).
44. See, e.g., Morey v. Independent School Dist., 312 F. Supp. 1257
(D. Minn. 1969); Wilcher v. Gain, 311 F. Supp. 754 (NJ). Cal. 1970).
45. See, e.g., Scher v. Bd. of Educ., 424 F.2d 741 (3d Cir. 1970); Dai-
ley v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970).
46. See generally Note, Injunctive Relief against Municipalities Un-
der Section 1983, 119 U. PA. L. Rsv. 389 (1970).
47. 365 F.2d 770 (8th Cir. 1966).
48. 378 F.2d.275 (4th Cir. 1967).
49. 365 F.2d at 773; Wall v. Stanley County Bd. of Educ., 259 F.
Supp. 238, 239 (M.D.N.C. 1966).
50. "365 F.2d at 784. The court allowed damages measured from
the time of dismissal to the time of an offer of re-employment, subject
to the usual rules of mitigation. Though the court did not expressly say
so, this formula implies that the damages are to be measured by con-
tract principles. See also 378 F.2d at 278.
51. The rule that the contract clause allows a person to sue a state
which has violated its own contract in federal court was laid down in
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch.) 87 (1810). See also Indiana ex rel.
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defense of the municipal non-liability rule under section 1983
raised, although it would have been applicable since the Supreme
Court reasoned in Monroe that a school board or welfare commis-
sion is no more a "person" under section 1983 in contract than in
tort.
A recent fifth circuit case, however, was directly confronted
with the rule of municipal non-liability in a teacher dismissal case
and refused to apply it. In Harkless v. Sweeny Independent
School Dist.,52 ten Negro school teachers brought a section 1983
action against the district for reinstatement and back pay because
their contracts had not been renewed when the district was de-
segregated. The members of the school board were not sued as
individuals after two members of the jury stated at voir dire that
they would not hold officials of the district individually liable for
money damages.
The district court dismissed the suit, holding that neither the
district nor the individuals in their official capacities were proper
parties under the Supreme Court's ruling in Monroe.53 The court
of appeals, reversing, noted that a school district "is of the nature
of a municipality '54 under Texas law, but limited the Monroe non-
liability rule to situations in which a municipality is sued "for
damages under the doctrine of respondeat superior for the con-
duct of its police officers."55 The court noted that equitable re-
lief was available in section 1983 actions against both municipali-
ties and individuals in their official capacity.5 It reasoned that
since "[t] he prayer for back pay is not a claim for damages, but
Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95 (1937), where a teacher's "permanent"
contract was terminated after repeal of the tenure law. The court held
that this was an unconstitutional impairment of the contract and or-
dered the teacher reinstated. These cases do not fall within the scope of
protection offered by the contract clause. The terminations involved
were permissible under contract law, but impermissible under the four-
teenth amendment. Since municipal contracts have always been subject
to federal scrutiny under the contract clause, scrutiny under section 1983
and the fourteenth amendment was not a large departure from existing
practice.
In a similar case, Brooks v. Yeatman, 311 F. Supp. 364 (M.D. Tenn.
1970), the court departed slightly from the clear precedent in contract
and awarded damages for the non-payment of welfare benefits. The
award in this case was measured by the amount that the plaintiff would
have received had the benefits not been terminated, and more closely
approximates a contract measure than a tort measure.
52. 427 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1970).
53. 300 F. Supp. 794 (S.D. Tex. 1969).
54. 427 F.2d at 321.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 323.
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is an integral part of the equitable remedy of injunctive rein-
statement,"57 there is nothing to prevent an award of back pay.58
The court implicitly rejected the logic of the non-liability rule
and the policy arguments against depleting municipal reserves,
but did not ' discuss the reasoning behind this result. It only sug-
gested that the imposition of financial liability on a local govern-
mental body under section 1983 was consistent with increasing
federal power over local governments in civil rights matters.50
The decisions that have allowed injunctive relief and dam-
ages directly against municipalities under section 1983 have been
cases where the liability of the governmental body was non-mon-
etary or limited by the voluntary assumption of obligations as
distinguished from cases where the liability was relatively un-
limite& and measured on tort-like principles under section
1983.60 This distinction in the application of the rule of munici-
pal non-liability is not based on Monroe. Instead, it is based on
the policy that it is not desirable to impose unlimited liability on
municipalities which may be unable to meet the financial bur-
den.61 This rationale becomes less convincing, however, as more
and more states, either by court order or legislative action, aban-
don the obsolescent doctrine of sovereign immunity and impose
tort liability on themselves and their political subdivisions.
In Adams and the cases following its lead the lower courts
have greatly expanded the power of federal courts under section
1983 in decisions compelling or prohibiting municipal action
through the use of the courts' equity powers. Such extension in-
volves an imposition of federal power over local governmental
bodies approximately equivalent to the power to assess damages.
The power to nullify the effect of a validly enacted ordinance,0 2
or the power to order the rehiring of a teacher and payment of
back pay 63 affect the autonomy of local government at least as
57. Id. at 324.
58. In response to this reasoning the dissenting judge said: "I am in
agreement with the district court in its holding that Monroe v. Pape...
means what it says and that it requires dismissal of appellants' com-
plaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Id.
59. Id. at 323. See also note 65 infra.
60. See note 13 supra.
61. This raises the spectre of a municipality's "court-houses, itsjails, its poorhouses, its hospitals, [and] its schools . . ." being sold to
satisfy judgments. CONG. GLOB, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 763 (1871) (Senator
Casserly).
62. See, e.g., Adams v. City of Park Ridge, 293 F.2d 585 (7th Cir.
1961).
63. See, e.g., Harkless v. Sweeny Independent School Dist., 427 F.2d
319 (5th Cir. 1970).
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greatly as the power to assess damages for constitutional vio-
lations. Though there are no cases that grant an award of money
damages measured on tort principles, there is arguable precedent
for such an award,6 4 so that a decision to grant the tort measure
would not be a major expansion of federal power. Such an ex-
pansion would also parallel the rapid growth of federal power
over municipal treasuries in the civil rights field. 5 In view of
this expansion of section 1983 and the concomitant narrowing of
the rule of municipal non-liability, it is possible that in the future
the federal courts, under continued pressure from plaintiffs, may
hold municipalities liable directly under section 1983 for the con-
duct of their officers.
IV. USE OF 42 U.S.C. § 1988 TO CIRCUMVENT THE
NON-LIABILITY RULE
The fifth circuit has done the most to replace the rule of gov-
ernmental non-liability with one of liability. But even in Hark-
less the court still regarded the rule as controlling on the specific
facts of Monroe.6 6 Despite the prolonged trend that eventually
may allow recovery directly against governmental bodies, at pres-
ent, plaintiffs must attempt to circumvent the rule. The most suc-
cessful attempts so far have been accomplished by reading 42
U.S.C. § 198867 together with section 1983.
64. See notes 47-51 supra.
65. In the field of education the power of supervision is extensive.
In Griffin v. County School Bd. of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218
(1964), the Supreme Court held that lower federal courts have the power
to enjoin local government bodies from
paying county tuition grants or giving tax exemptions and
from processing applications for state tuition grants . . . [and
power to] require the [county] Supervisors to exercise the
power that is theirs to levy taxes to raise funds adequate to
reopen, operate, and maintain without racial discrimination a
public school system ....
Id. at 232-33. See also Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396
U.S. 19 (1969) (power to order compliance with a desegregation plan sug-
gested by HEW and power to modify any plan adopted by the school
board).
In the area of voting rights the Court has also exercised direct con-
trol over the elections basic to any municipality's or state's power to
govern itself. Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964) (power to prohibit elec-
tions until reapportionment is effected); WMCA, Inc. v. Lorenzo, 377 U.S.
633 (1964) (power to determine whether elections for the state legislature
may be held immediately or must await reapportionment), and Reynolds
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (power to prohibit elections until reappor-
tionment is effected).
66. "[T]he holding in Monroe v. Pape would be restricted by the
facts of the case to proscribing a suit against a municipality under the
doctrine of respondeat superior for damages." 427 F.2d at 321.
67. For the text of the statute, see note 4 supra.
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Section 1988 provides that the Civil Rights Acts 8 shall be
"enforced in conformity with the laws of the United States, so far
as such laws are suitable to carry the same into effect; ... but
in all cases where they [federal remedies] are not adapted to the
object, or are deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suit-
able xemedies... , the common law, as modifed and changed by
the constitution and statutes of the State. . ., so far as the same
is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United
States, shall be extended to and govern the said [federal] courts.
* . ." In order to apply section 1988 courts have held that three
things must be shown: (1) a state law provides the desired rem-
edy; 9 (2) the section of the Civil Rights Act in question is defi-
cient in a provision necessary to furnish an adequate remedy to
vindicate the plaintiff's civil rights,7 0 and (3) the state remedy is
68. Section 1988 was originally enacted as Act of April 9, 1866, ch.
31, § 3, 14 Stat. 27. It was subsequently re-enacted as Act of May 31,
1870, ch. 114, § 18, 16 Stat. 144, pursuant to § 5 of the fourteenth amend-
mnent, which was ratified -in 1868. When Congress passed section 1983
as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, it specifically incorporated section
1988. Sdction 1983 (originally enacted as Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22,
§ 1, 17 Stat. 13) read as follows, before the revision of 1874:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives
of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That
any person who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage of any State, shall subject, or cause
to be subjected, any person within the jurisdiction of the United
States to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution of the United States, shall, any
such law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of the
State to the contrary notwithstanding, be liable to the party
injured in any action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress; such proceeding to be prosecuted in the
several district or circuit courts of the United States, with and
subject to the same rights of appeal, review upon error, and
other remedies provided in like cases in such courts, under the
provisions of the act of the ninth of April, eighteen hundred
and sixty-six, entitled "An act to protect all persons in the
United States in their civil rights, and to furnish the means of
their vindication!; and the other remedial laws of the United
States which are in their nature applicable in such cases (em-
phasis-added).
Section 1983 was codified and re-enacted by Congress as R.S. 2d ed.
§ 1979 (1878), which omitted the reference to the Civil Rights Act of
1866. The omitted reference was at the same time incorporated directly
into section 1988 in R.S. 2d ed. § 722 (1878) in the reference to the section
of the Revised Statutes titled CIVIL RIGHTS. The current sections in the
Urzrm STATEs CoDE included in the chapter entitled CIVIL RIGaTs are
42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-83, 1985-87, 1989-92 and 1994 (1964). In the revision
of 1874 the coverage of section 1988 was expanded to include 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1986 & 1994.
69. Brazier v. Cherry, 293 F.2d 401, 409 (5th Cir. 1961).
70. Id. See also Sherrod v. Pink Hat Cafe, 250 F. Supp. 516 (ND.
Miss. 1965). The Supreme Court used a similar test in Sullivan v. Little
Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969). The following test was used by
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not inconsistent with federal law.71 There was no clear indica-
tion of congressional purpose in enacting the statute.7 2  The
courts have themselves decided that the purpose of section 1988
is to enlarge the relief available under the Civil Rights Acts78 by
incorporating into them whatever remedies have been devel-
oped by the states.74 To use section 1988 with section 1983, the
state must have a statute or court ruling allowing suits against
the state or municipality for the torts of their agents. 75
the court in Brazier:
[W]hat is needed in the particular case under scrutiny to make
the civil rights statutes fully effective? The answer to that
inquiry is then matched against (a) federal law and if it is
found wanting the court must look to (b) state law currently in
effect. To whatever extent (b) helps, it is automatically avail-
able ....
293 F.2d at 409.
71. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969) (Har-
lan, J., dissenting); Pritchard v. Smith, 289 F.2d 153 (8th Cir. 1961);
Wilcher v. Gain, 311 F. Supp. 754 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
72. The case in which state law provided a broader remedy for de-
privation of a federally secured right than federal law was not discussed
during the debates. The first judicial reference to the Act was in Tennes-
see v. David, 100 U.S. 257, 299, (1879) (Clifford, J., dissenting). He called
it "a mere jumble of Federal law, common law, and State law, consisting
of incongruous and irreconcilable regulations . .. ."
73. Pritchard v. Smith, 289 F.2d 153 (8th Cir. 1961).
74. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968); Culpepper v.
Reynolds Metals Co., 296 F. Supp. 1232 (N.D. Ga. 1969). The court in
Culpepper suggested that section 1988 "arguably infers [sic] the adop-
tion of future laws relating to the bringing of actions arising under the
[Civil Rights] acts . . . ." 296 F. Supp. at 1243 n.l.
75. The common law rule is that a governmental body is not liable
for damage inflicted in the exercise of its governmental functions. This
is the ancient doctrine of sovereign immunity, which had its origin in the
idea that the "king can do no wrong." See Jaffe, Suits Against Gov-
ernments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1963).
Legal scholars have agreed that this general immunity is an anach-
ronism in American law. See, e.g., Borchard, Government Liability in
Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 129 (1924); 229 (1925); 36 YALE L.J. 1 (1926); Mag-
uire, State Liability for Tort, 30 HARv. L. REV. 20 (1916).
The common law rule has been modified in some states by statutes
and judicial decisions. In the following states the state and its political
subdivisions are liable for the torts of their officials:
Arizona: Stone v. Arizona Hwy. Comm'n, 93 Ariz. 384, 381 P.2d 107
(1963)
California: CAL. Gov'T. CODE §§ 815.2, 818 (1966).
Hawaii: HAWAn REv. LAWS § 245A-2 (Supp. 1965).
Iowa: IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 25A1-A20 (1967).
Minnesota: MINN. STAT. §§ 466.01-.15 (1969).
Nevada: NEV. REv. STAT. § 41.031 (1968).
New York: N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8 (1963).
North Carolina: N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-291, -300.1 (1964).
Washington: WASH. REV. CODE §§ 4.92.010-4.96.020 (1970).
Wisconsin: Holytz v. Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618
(1962).
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There is precedent for this practice of looking to state law to
supplement federal law. 7 6 The question of whether a particular
federal remedy is deficient, thereby allowing use of the state rem-
edy, has provoked little controversy. The courts have found de-
ficiences in federal laws and procedures such as a district court
pro hac vice rule limiting out-of-state attorneys to one appear-
ance a year,7 7 a. district court requirement for filing petitions for
removal from state courts that caused expense and delay, 8 and
In the following states municipalities are liable for the torts of their
officials:
Alaska: ALASKA STT. § 09.65.070 (1962).
Florida: FLA. STAT. § 95.24 (1967).
Illinois: Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit. Dist. No. 302, 18 Ill.
2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959).
Michigan: Williams v. Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 111 N.W.2d 1 (1961).
New Jersey: McAndrew v. Mularchuck, 33 N.J. 172, 162 A.2d 820
(1960).
Oklahoma: OLA. STAT. AwN. § 1753 (1965).
Virginia: VA. CODE ANN. § 8-42.1 (1970) (this statute was mistakenly
placed in the venue section of the Va. Code; Markham v. Newport News,
292 F.2d 711 (4th Cir. 1961).
In the following states municipalities are liable for the torts of
their officials to the extent that the municipalities have insurance:
Idaho: IDAHO CODE AwN. § 41-3505 (1961).
Missouri: Mo. STAT. ANN. § 71.185 (1970).
New Hampshire: N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 412.3 (1968).
New Mexico: N.1. STAT. ANN. § 5-6-20 (1966).
North Dakota: N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-43-07 (1968).
Vermont: VT. STAT. AxrN. tit. 29, § 1403 (1970).
Wyoming: WYo. STAT. ANx. § 15.1-4 (1965).
In the following states there is no statutory imposition of munici-
pal liability:
Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Indi-
ana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Is-
land, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah and West
Virginia.
76. Where federal law is silent, state law has provided a statute of
limitations in Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Workers of Int'l Harvester Co.,
427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1970); Hughes v. Smith, 264 F. Supp. 767 (D. N.J.
1967); survival of a cause of action in Brazier v. Cherry, 293 F.2d 401 (5th
Cir. 1961); Pritchard v. Smith, 289 F.2d 153 (8th Cir. 1961); Galindo v.
Brownell 255 F. Supp. 930 (S.D. CaL 1966); provision for damages in
Sullivan v. Little.Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229 (1969); Sherrod v. Pink Hat
Cafe, 250 F. Supp. 516 (N.D. Miss. 1965).
State law has also been incorporated into section 1983 to provide de-
fenses. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (judicial immunity and action
in good faith under a statute that is later declared unconstitutional);
Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951) (legislative immunity); Daniels
v. Van de Venter, 382 F.2d 29 (10th Cir. 1967) (arrest with probable
cause).
77. Sanders v. Russell, 401 F.2d 241 (5th Cir. 1968).
78. Brown v.. City of Meridian, 356 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1966); Lefton
v. City of Hattiesburg, 333 F.2d 280 (5th Cir. 1964).
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the failure of a statute to provide for damages, 79 or survivor-
ship.80 The courts that have considered the question have held
that the inability to hold municipalities liable for the conduct of
their officials is a deficiency in section 1983 within the meaning
of section 1988.81
This requirement poses a difficult question of construction,
particularly when viewed in light of the section 1988 requirement
that the state remedy to be incorporated be consistent with feder-
al law. If "deficient" means failure to produce the desired result,
the section is an invitation to resort to state law whenever federal
law produces undesirable results. This loose reading of the de-
ficiency requirement also raises questions of consistency of fed-
eral law. Where a law manifests a federal policy, even though
that law may be deficient from the point of view of a plaintiff, an
attempt to nullify it by use of a state law will be inconsistent with
federal law. This reasoning was used by a California district
court in Wilcher v. Gain8 2 to deny the recovery of damages di-
rectly from the governmental body under sections 1983 and 1988.
The court reasoned that Monroe established that Congress, in en-
acting section 1983, intended to exclude municipalities from the
scope of liability under section 1983.83 Hence, the inability to se-
cure damages from a municipality under section 1983 was not a
deficiency in federal law, but a congressional policy manifested
in federal law, and any attempt to depart from that policy was
inconsistent with federal law.
Two other district courts have suggested another approach
that may allow relief under the combination of statutes based on
assumptions about Monroe different from those in Wilcher. A
New York district court in Sostre v. Rockefeller84 considered the
rule of municipal non-liability as originating from a silence in
79. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969); Sher-
rod v. Pink Hat Cafe, 250 F. Supp. 516 (N.D. Miss. 1965).
80. Brazier v. Cherry, 293 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1961); Pritchard v.
Smith, 289 F.2d 153 (8th Cir. 1961); Galindo v. Brownell, 255 F. Supp. 930
(S.D. Cal. 1966).
81. Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), rev'd in
part, Sostre v. McGinnis, No. 35038 (2d Cir. Feb. 24, 1971); United States
ex rel. Washington v. Chester County Police Dep't, 294 F. Supp. 1157
(E.D. Pa. 1969), aff'd on rehearing, 300 F. Supp. 1279 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
82. 311 F. Supp. 754 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
83. The ninth circuit does not allow injunctive relief against mu-
nicipalities under section 1983. Diamond v. Pitchess, 411 F.2d 565 (9th
Cir. 1969).
84. 312 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), rev'd in part, Sostre v. Mc-
Ginnis, No. 35038 (2d Cir. Feb. 24, 1971). On appeal the state was dropped
as a defendant and only individuals were retained. The question of gov-
ernmental liability therefore was not an issue on appeal and plaintiff
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the federal- law,, rather than from a manifest federal policy
against governmental liability. The federal law could thus be
called deficient to the extent that it did not deal with the issue
before the court; and since the rule was only the result of silence
in.the law, the use of state law to provide the missing remedy
was not inconsistent with the federal law. It reasoned that "if it
c anoble said that Congress has not provided a damage remedy...
under section 1983; and further that there is no other federal
remedy becauseMonroe v. Pape... left the question open...
then the court looks to New York's remedy... as provided by 42
U.S.C. § 1988."s5- The effect of this reasoning is that the rule of
municipal non-liability forbids recovery of damages directly
from a municipality under federal law alone. It does not pro-
hibit plaintiffs, however, from supplementing federal law with
state law.
A-Pennsylvania district court in United States ex rel. Wash-
ingtonov. Chester County Police Dept.80 met the same question
in the.context of. a different civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1981.87
Under section 1981 the court faced a rule against damage awards
that is analogous to the rule against damage awards against gov-
did not argue that the state was liable in damages under the combination
of sections 1988 and 1983. The court noted by way of dictum that a state is
not liable for damages under section 1983 standing alone. No. 35038 at
1686.
.85. Id. at- 886-87. The court used N.Y. CoRREc. LAw § 6b and N.Y.
CT. CL. ACT § 8 (1968). The same court in Laverne v. Coming, 316 F.
Supp. 629 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), nbted that had the suit been filed in time, the
plaintiff in that case could have recovered from the village for the mis-
conduct of its police officers under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
Evidentlyr the court assumed that the theory of recovery would be a
combination of section 1983 with section 1988 and the above New York
laws.
86. 294 F; Supp. 1157 (E.D. Pa. 1969), affd. on rehearing, 300 F.
Supp. 1279 (EDl. Pa. 1970).
- 87. -42 U.S:C. § 1981 (1964):
S .All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States
shall have the same right in every State and Territory to
make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and
to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens,
and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes,
liceises, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
The use, of section 1981 as a basis of an action for police misconduct is
unique ,to this case and it remains to be seen if other courts will follow
this ext nsion of the statute. One court, in Mack v. Lewis, 298 F. Supp.
1351 (SD. Ga. 1969), has already indicated that it will not. There the
court reasoned that since municipalities were not liable for the miscon-
duct of their police officers under section 1983, they should not be liable
sim'ply because section. 1981 and 1988 &re read together. That statement
is dictum since-neither section was before the court. The court also
found a7 congressional intent that municipalities not be liable under sec-
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ernmental bodies under section 1983.88 When the plaintiff
sought to combine section 1981 with section 1988 to provide a
damage remedy by incorporating the remedy available under the
common law tort of battery, the court acknowledged the force of
the rule prohibiting damages under section 1981, but said the
issue before it was whether damages could be awarded under sec-
tion 1981 considered in light of "the mandate of 42 U.S.C. §
1988."8 9 The court, in denying the defendant's motion to dismiss,
said in effect that, while there is a body of interpretive law gov-
erning the use of section 1981 disallowing damages, this body of
law does not necessarily govern the use of section 1981 when it is
read together with section 1988.
The effect of this reasoning is to allow plaintiffs to use sec-
tion 1988 to supplement civil rights statutes, but it is not as con-
ceptually convincing as the rationale in Sostre, because it ignores
the difficult question of what constitutes a deficiency in a partic-
ular civil rights statute. It is arguable that once section 1988 ap-
plies, the court should consider the statutory combination as a dif-
ferent statute than the particular civil rights statute standing
alone, thus avoiding the consistency requirement; but the ap-
proach does not help in determining whether or not section 1988
applies at the outset.
If either of these approaches is used to incorporate state law
into section 1983 by way of section 1988, there are several conse-
quential effects that must be examined. The use of section 1988
will conflict with the attempt to develop a uniform national policy
under the Civil Rights Act,90 since governmental bodies will be
liable in some states but not in others. Variations already exist
with regard to statutes of limitations9' which admittedly have
less effect on the remedy than the presence or absence of gov-
ernmental liability. Here, however, it is apparent from the face
of section 1988 that it was not designed to promote national uni-
formity, but to allow supplemental use of state law. Any incon-
sistency is the result of its conflict with the policy of uniformity
tion 1983 or section 1981. This is faulty reasoning since section 1981 was
passed nearly a year before section 1983, so congressional intent in pass-
ing section 1983 cannot be attributed to section 1981.
88. Hanna v. Home Ins. Co., 281 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
365 U.S. 838 (1961); Watson v. Devlin, 167 F. Supp. 638 (E.D. Mich. 1958),
atfd, 268 F.2d 211 (6th Cir. 1969); Hirych v. State, 376 Mich. 384, 136
N.W.2d 910 (1965).
89. 300 F. Supp. at 1282.
90. Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1965).
91. O'Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U.S. 318 (1914); Waters v. Wisconsin
Steel Workers of Int'l Harvester Co., 427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1970);
Hughes v. Smith, 264 F. Supp. 767 (D.N.J. 1967).
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of civil rights statutes. Use of section 1988 also raises the more
serious question of the extent to which the court should adopt the
state's law. Few states have replaced completely the common
law rule of governmental immunity with a rule of liability.
Many allow recovery only where the governmental body has in-
surance9 2 and only to the extent of the insurance;93 others estab-
lish defenses, 94 and others require notification of claims within a
certain period.95
The Supreme Court has not determined the extent to which
state law should be incorporated. In Sullivan v. Little Hunting
Park96 the Court noted the need for uniformity and said that
any state or common law rule incorporated by section 1988 be-
comes federal law.2 7 The Court, however, did not elaborate since
damages were not an issue. As a result the implications of its
statement are unclear. Section 1988 provides that federal courts
are to apply state remedies in the absence of a suitable federal
remedy. But the Court, as Mr. Justice Harlan notes in his dis-
sent, says that the state remedy becomes a federal remedy under
section 1988 and is then re-imposed on the states.98 How much
of a particular state remedy is to be incorporated into the federal
remedy, what defenses and modifications of the basic remedy
must also be incorporated, and whether, in the extreme, the rem-
edy of one state could be imposed upon another as a federal rem-
edy are not discussed by the Court.
The most workable solution to this difficulty appears to be
the suggestion of the court in Sostre, adopting the state statute's
rule of liabilty, but not its defenses.99 It used the federal com-
mon law defenses to section 1983 actions instead.100 This ap-
proach is necessary unless recovery against a governmental body
under section 1983 is to become a tangle of different state
laws.10 1 The best resolution appears to be a federal rule that if
a state provides for governmental tort liability, that liability will
be incorporated into section 1983 through section 1988. This in-
92. Mo. STAT. ANx. § 71.185 (1970).
93. IDAHO COD. ANN. § 41-3505 (1961).
94. See note 85 supra.
95. Mimw. STAT. § 466.05 (1969).
96. 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
97. Id. at 240.
98. Id. at 256-57.
99. 312 F. Supp. at 887.
100. Id.
101. This difficulty was forseen by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Indian
Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 65-68 (1955), where he refused
to read state law into the Federal Tort Claims Act.
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corporation will be allowed to vary from state to state on the
basis of different provisions in state laws only to the extent that
those provisions significantly affect the ability of the government-
al body to bear the cost of liability. In this way, state provisions
such as those allowing liability only where a municipality has in-
surance and to the extent of that insurance will be incorporated
into the right to recover under section 1983, where a provision al-
lowing municipal liability in suits in state courts but not in fed-
eral courts would not be incorporated. This approach will not
place a financial burden on governmental bodies that are unpre-
pared or unable to bear it 10 2 and will hold to a minimum local
variation in procedural and substantive rights.
V. CONCLUSION
A growing number of lower federal courts are limiting the
rule of municipal non-liability in two distinct ways. First, they
are reading the rule as announced in Monroe as one based on pol-
icy rather than legislative intent, and refusing to apply it where
the policy considerations implicit in Monroe are absent. Sec-
ondly, a few have indicated they may allow recovery of damages
under state law as incorporated into section 1983 by way of sec-
tion 1988. The complete abolition of the rule of non-liability un-
der section 1983 alone will probably have to await wide-spread
municipal liability under state law, or the federal courts will risk
imposition of large liability that will impair the functioning of
small governmental bodies. Ultimately, this result would be the
preferable one because it would provide a nationally uniform pol-
icy in vindicating constitutional guarantees. Until that time,
however, the combination of statutes, section 1983, section 1988
and state law offers the most promising remedy for aggrieved
plaintiffs. It provides more adequate compensation to the in-
jured person than the individual liability now available. In
addition, it provides an incentive to the governmental body to
provide the necessary police services in a manner consistent with
constitutional guarantees. Finally, since this method looks to
state law, it will not impose liability on local governmental bodies
until they are aware of their liability and have had an opportu-
nity to prepare their treasuries for it.
102. This approach is consistent with the policy implicit in Harkless.
See text accompanying note 59 supra. This approach should also mini-
mize the negative incentive for states to provide municipal liability that
would be present if federal courts ignored the liability ceilings or insur-
ance-related restrictions imposed by the states.
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